It is not possible here to give a full account of the Corpus Juris ('CJ'), but it may suffice to say that it is set under two I would like to raise a few issues in this context. First, the CJ, if it is to be adopted, needs a legal basis in EU law.
Secondly, the provisions contained in
Article 28 of the CJ (on appeals to the European Court of Justice (ECJ)) raise the question of whether it would be possible for the ECJ, as it is presently constituted, to fulfil the role envisaged.
Thirdly, the introduction of an EPP needs to be considered from a constitutional point of view. Lastly the compatibility of the CJ with Articles 226-233 needs to be considered.
LEGAL BASIS FOR THE CJ
The CJ is a remarkable text. One assumes that it will be revised after July-1999, and continue its progress. One important consideration when revising it should be knowing where it will fit in the legal architecture of the EU, for this will define the way it is re-drafted. Will it be re-drafted as a convention, or a framework regulation, or as a (more precise) first pillar regulation, destined to have direct effect in the Member States?
The determination of its future legal basis o seems essential.
The first pillar option
Opinions differ as to whether the CJ could be integrated into the 'first pillar' (which regulates economic activity) after 
Implications of legal basis uncertainty
The CJ looks to the unification of criminal laws and procedures in the member states, an aim not explicit in the original treaties, and not hitherto fullv discussed at inter-governmental Historically, the preliminary ruling procedure has worked well and has promoted uniformity of interpretation in the Member States. However the procedure can be lengthy (18 months or more). There would be a need to ensure that the preliminary ruling procedure is not used purely as a delaying tactic. Such tactics could be counter-productive in the fight against fraud and corruption affecting the EU budget.
FURTHER READING
A fuller account of the Corpus Juris proposals can be found in S White (1998) so the proposal is not as outlandish as it first appears. If a specialised court were to be adopted, delays could of course be reduced to a minimum. However, the creation of a specialised court would require a treaty amendment.
Another proposal was that the ECJ could become more like the US Federal Court and act as the court of last instance as far as certain Community matters are concerned (op. cit., 1996 Report). If the ECJ were to have this role in relation with the CJ, this would have the effect of removing the need for preliminary rulings.
Articles 28(l)(b) and (c) of the CJ give the Commission and the EPP the right to refer a case to the ECJ on any dispute concerning the application of the CJ. This differs from Article 234 (ex Article 177) which only enables properly constituted courts and tribunals o^ fAe member state; to make references to the ECJ. The ECJ has ruled in fretore a"i 5a/u (fretore di Sa/u vX (Case 14/86) [1987] 
INTRODUCTION OF AN EPP
The introduction of a European Public Prosecutor, a sixth Community institution (or institution of the EU depending on the legal basis chosen for the CJ) means that the Treaty would have to be amended.
APPLICATION OF EC LAW
Should the CJ become a first pillar instrument, the 'acquis communautaire' (that is to say the sum of established EC law and juris prudence) would apply. This means that, inter alia, Treaty Articles 226-233 (previously Articles 169-176) would apply to the CJ.
Treaty Ardc/e 226 (ex ArdcJe J69)
Member States who failed to comply with an opinion of the Commission with regard to the CJ within the time laid down by the Commission might be brought to the ECJ.
Treaty Artide 227 (ex Ardde J 70)
A Member State may bring another member state to court for failing to fulfil o an obligation under the Treaty. This is covered in article 2 8 of the CJ itself.
Treaty Artic/e 228 (ex Artide / 7 J)
A Member State can be fined for failing to take the necessary measures to comply with an ECJ judgment within the time limits laid down by the Commission. This could mean, for example, that failing to implement a judgment from the ECJ requiring changes in criminal procedure could lead to a fine. It is unclear what this may mean in practice should the CJ be adopted as a regulation. Would this article give the ECJ jurisdiction over criminal penalties?
Treaty Artide 230 (ex Artide J 73)
At present the ECJ has the power to review the legality of acts adopted jointly by the European Parliament and the Council, acts of the Council, the Commission and of the European Central Bank (ECB). It is not known whether these review powers would extend to the actions of the EPF^ nor is it clear to whom the EPP would be accountable.
Treaty ArtJcJe 23 J (ex ArficJe J 74)
The ECJ has the power to declare an act void. This raises the same question as above.
Treaty Article 232 (ex Article 175)
Article 232 gives the ECJ jurisdiction to establish infringements committed by the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission or the ECB. It is unclear whether the EPP would be added to this list.
Treaty Article 233 (ex Article 1 76)
The institutions named in Article 232, except the ECB, are required to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the ECJ when an act has been declared void and when their failure to act has been declared contrary to the Treaty. Would similar obligations also fall on the EPP?
CONCLUSION
The above text only highlights some of the issues of compatibility of the CJ with EU law. It seems important that the CJ be tested, line by line, for compatibility not only with national criminal law and procedure, but also with EU law, in relation to the first and the third pillar. 
